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POINT 1 
THIS COURT MAY NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT HANKS9 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW EVIDENCE NOT INCLUDED IN THE 
RECORD 
Defendant Hanks distorts the record by attempting to introduce evidence not 
found in the record. New evidence introduced by Defendant Hanks may not be 
considered by this court because it was not preserved in the record. 
The appellate court may not consider Defendant Hank's arguments which rely 
on the introduction of new information because "[the appellate court] may weigh 
only those facts and legal arguments preserved for in the trial court record. Olson 
v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App.,1991); citing 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1990). 
"Counsel's recollection of the course of proceedings is no substitute for a record of 
those proceedings." Olson, 815 P.2d at 1359. 
In the state of Utah the district courts are the courts of record. Olson, at 1359; 
citing e.g., State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 936 n. 3 (Utah App. 1990); Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, § 1; Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-2 (1987). "The role of the appellate court is 
to sift the parties' arguments in light of 'the facts found by the trial court and 
square them with the law.'" Olson, at 1359; quoting State v. Vigil 815 P.2d 1296, 
1299. The appellate court "may.. .weigh only those facts and legal arguments 
preserved.. .in the trial court record." Olson, at 1359; citing Ringwood v. Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1990). 
The only x\ enue available for a party to modify a record is Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 11(h). "But a motion under Rule 11(h) is appropriate only 
when the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a 
dispute as to the accuracy of reporting and not to introduce new material into the 
record., Olson, at 1359; citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478-79 & n. 17 
(Utah 1990). 
In the current case Defendant Hanks has introduced new material that was not 
part of the original record. New material introduced by Defendant Hanks 
includes: 
o Allegations that Defendant Hanks was not a shareholder in G3C. 
(Defendant's Response Brief at 41, 46). 
® Allegations xhat all GSC creditors, besides Defendant Hanks, had 
vacated their claims. (Defendant's Resp. Br, at 16, 29, 48). 
• Claims that Defendant Hanks was the only legitimate creditor of 
GSC. (Defendant's Resp. Br. at 20, 48) 
• Conversations between Defendant Hanks and the State of Utah 
regarding the dissolution of GSC. (Defendant's Resp. Br. at 47). 
None of these facts were alleged by Defendant Hanks at trial or prior to the 
completion of the record. Due to the fact that these allegations were not part of 
the original record Defendant Hanks argument's surrounding these assertions 
cannot be considered. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE OVERRULE© BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HANKS ADMITS TO SELF-DEALING 
In his brief, Defendant Hanks states that he was a GSC board member, a 
legitimate creditor of GSC, and that he voted to transfer the patent mining claims 
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to himself. (Defendant's Resp. Br. at 20, 31); Ex. 4; 57. The lower court ruling 
should therefore be overturned because Defendant Hanks admits to allegations 
made in the record regarding his engagement in self-dealing. 
As stated in Plaintiffs opening brief, "Utah Supreme Court precedent 
establishes the illegality of directors preferring the payment of debts in which they 
have a personal stake, and the impropriety of even participating in transactions 
where the directors have a personal interest. Walker Bros, v. Eastern Motors Co., 
262 P. 97, 98 (Utah 1927); Davis v. Heath Dev. Co. 558 P,2d 594, 596 (Utah 
1976). 
Defendant's statement that he voted to transfer the patent mining claims to 
himself as a director, and not as a shareholder, is an admission to self-dealing. 
(Defendant's Resp. Br. at 31). It is important to note that the impropriety of the 
transactions in Walker Brothers and in Davis came as a result of the directors, and 
not the shareholders, transferring corporate assets to satisfy a personal financial 
interest. See Davis 558 P.2d at 596; Walker Bros. 262 P. at 98. 
Defendant Hanks also engaged in self dealing when he orchestrated a vote 
to transfer the mining claims to COG. Regardless of the actual date of the 
incorporation of COG, Defendant Hanks was still a majority shareholder in that 
corporation and a director in GSC when he transferred the mining claims to COG. 
Ex. 57 p. 2. Defendant Hanks ownership interest in COG in addition to his board 
position with GSC invalidated his transfer of the mining claims to COG because it 
constituted self dealing. See Davis 558 P.2d at 595. 
Defendant acknowledges that he was a legitimate GSC creditor and that he 
orchesirated and voted for the transfer of the four patent mining claims Lo himself. 
This, in addition to his ownership interest in COG invalidated the transfers of the 
mining claims. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the lower court for 
judicial dissolution. 
POINT III 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE 
PATENT MINING CLAIMS WERE NOT TRANSFERRED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW 
The transfer of the mining claims was invalid whether or not it followed the 
GSC articles of incorporation. The transfer was invalid because it was outside the 
ordinary course of business and GSC transferred all of its assets. 
When a corporation conveys all of its assets Utah law, and not the articles of 
incorporation, determine the propriety the conveyance. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has held that when, outside the ordinary course of business, a corporation 
sells all of its assets, that the sale requires shareholder approval before the 
transaction can be deemed valid. Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 121 (Utah 
1992); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1202(l). 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1202(l) states that to properly convey substantially 
all of a corporation's assets the corporation's board of directors must (1) adopt a 
resolution recommending the conveyance, (2) provide a written or printed notice 
of the resolution to each shareholder entitled to vote, and that (3) the resolution 
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must be adopted by the shareholders. Fan; 829 P.2d at 120-121; Utah Code Ann. § 
l6-10a-1202(l). 
On January 20, 2002 Defendant Hanks, acting as a GSC director, signed a quit 
claim deed which transferred the four patent mining claims to himself. (R. 482 at 
209); Ex. 9. Three days later, on January 23, this transfer was proposed to, and 
voted on, by the shareholders. (R. 482 at 58-59: 22-25; 1-23). However, the 
greater part of the shareholders was never informed that the patent mining claims 
had already been transferred because the only vote concerning this transfer came 
three days after Defendant Hanks claims the mining claims had been transferred to 
him. (R. 482 at 60: 1-13). Consequently, Defendant Hank's orchestration of this 
vote was nothing more than a post hoc attempt to ratify a backroom deal. 
Regardless of whether or not this backroom deal complied with GSC articles of 
incorporation it violated Utah Law. Because the transfer was made behind closed 
doors, and proper procedure was never followed, the trial court's raling should be 
overturned and judicial dissolution granted. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF FACT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF 
HUNT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
GSC should be judicially dissolved because the trial court's finding of facts 
support Plaintiff Hunt's request for judicial dissolution. Utah Code Annotated § 
16-10a-1430 establishes the grounds for judicial dissolution; the statute states in 
part that: 
(2) A corporation ma}/ be dissolved in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is 
established that: ...(b) the directors or those in control of the corporation 
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or 
fraudulent;...(d) the coiporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact support Plaintiff Hunt's petition for judicial 
dissolution. The trial court's findings of fact effectively recognize that Defendant 
Hanks, a director for GSC, acted in an oppressive or fraudulent manner when he 
withheld corporate documents from GSC shareholders, including Plaintiff Hunt. 
(R. 353-359). The trial court also found that GSC assets were being misapplied or 
wasted when it ruled that Plaintiff Hunt was a valid creditor of GSC but that 
Defendant Hanks received an exclusive award of GSC's corporate assets. (R. 359 
14;R.360). 
Defendant Hanks has not provided any authority or evidence to the 
contrary. Because the findings of fact support judicial dissolution and Defendant 
Hanks has not been able to explain why the finding of fact do support the lower 
court's decision, the lower courts ruling should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it held that the mining claims were properly 
transferred to Defendant Hanks therefore this case should be remanded for judicial 
dissolution. ^ ^ 
DATED this ']J_ day of December, 2005. 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
Mark D. Stabbs, Attorne\ for Appellant 
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